In conversation with Arjit Benjamin, an IP enthusiast and an avid litigator, about practice area specialization and convergence of IP with Litigation

Arjit Benjamin

24 Feb 2019

In conversation with Arjit Benjamin, an IP enthusiast and an avid litigator, about practice area specialization and convergence of IP with Litigation

In this conversation with Legal Desire, Arjit Benjamin – Associate Partner at Prosoll Law reflects on his journey as both an intellectual property (IP) enthusiast and a courtroom litigator. With a career rooted in rights enforcement and regulatory litigation, Arjit offers his perspective on how practice-area specialization isn’t just a career choice, but a strategic necessity in today’s fragmented legal landscape.

Rather than treating IP as a siloed advisory vertical, Arjit supports its integration with dispute resolution. He believes that for IP to remain meaningful in a tech-driven world, lawyers must combine doctrinal depth with a litigator’s instincts, ensuring that innovation isn’t just protected on paper but defended in practice.

IP and Litigation: Two Sides of the Same Coin

Arjit emphasizes that intellectual property is no longer a soft, transactional practice. It intersects with business strategy, enforcement, and public perception. Having litigation experience allows lawyers to anticipate how IP rights will play out in real-world scenarios and advise clients accordingly.

Specialization Builds Trust and Depth

In a profession often focused on breadth, Arjit makes a strong case for depth. Specialization, he says, allows lawyers to build long-term credibility, differentiate themselves, and stay agile in a niche that demands constant adaptation – particularly in tech and innovation-heavy sectors.

Advice to Aspiring Lawyers: Choose Focus Over FOMO

His message to law students and young professionals is clear: don’t be afraid to pick a niche early. Get your fundamentals right, commit to consistent learning, and surround yourself with mentors who challenge your thinking, not just validate it.

IP in a Changing World: Be Legally Agile

With evolving challenges like AI-generated works, digital counterfeiting, and platform-based licensing, Arjit underlines the importance of doctrinal clarity and policy foresight. Lawyers must understand not just what the law is, but where it’s going next.

Convergence is the Future

Whether it’s contracts, data protection, branding, or innovation – Arjit sees IP as the thread connecting multiple domains. “A litigator who understands IP,” he says, “can protect both the asset and the intent behind it.”

Delhi HC Allows OP Chautala To Summon Records Of 1997 Closed DA Case To Defend Self In 2010 Under Trial DA Case

Harsh K. Sharma and Vaibhavi Sharma

1 Aug 2018

Delhi HC Allows OP Chautala To Summon Records Of 1997 Closed DA Case To Defend Self In 2010 Under Trial DA Case

Eight years after being charge-sheeted by the CBI in a disproportionate assets case, former Haryana Chief Minister OP Chautala has been allowed by the Delhi High Court to summon the record and witnesses pertaining to an FIR which was registered against him way back in year 1997 for allegedly amassing assets disproportionate to his known income only to end in a closure report.Justice…

Coparcenary Rights: Touchstone Of Equality

Vaibhavi Sharma

25 Jul 2018

Coparcenary Rights: Touchstone Of Equality

According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, entire property of a Hindu joint family is held in collective ownership, by all the coparceners, in a quasi-corporate capacity. The textual authority of the Mitakshara lays down in express terms that the joint family property is held, in trust, for the joint family members, then living and thereafter to be born. [1]

Section 6 Hindu Succession Act, 2005, as amended, stipulates that on and from the commencement of the amended Act, 2005, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener, in her own right, in the same manner as the son. It is apparent that the status conferred upon sons under the old section and the old Hindu Law was to treat them as coparceners since birth. The amended provision now statutorily recognizes the rights of the daughters as coparceners since birth.

The Apex court, subsequent to the said amendment, has observed that these changes have been sought to be made on the touchstone of equality, thus seeking to remove the perceived disability and prejudice to which a daughter was subjected. The fundamental changes brought forward about in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by amending it in 2005, are perhaps a realization of the immortal words of Roscoe Pound as appearing in his celebrated treaties, mentioning that:

“the law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still. Hence all thinking about law has struggled to reconcile the conflicting demands of the need of stability and the need of change.”[2]

This amendment now confers upon the daughter of the coparcener as well the status of coparcener in her own right, in the same manner as the son, and gives same rights and liabilities in the coparcener properties as she would have had if it had been a son.

The section stipulates that a daughter would be a coparcener from her birth, and would have the same rights and liabilities as that of a son. The daughter would hold property to which she is entitled as a coparcenary property, which would be construed as property being capable of being disposed of by her either by a will or any other testamentary disposition.

Explaining the amended provision, the Supreme Court of India observed, as follows:

 “It is apparent that the status conferred upon sons under the old section and the old Hindu Law was to treat them as coparceners since birth. The amended provision now statutorily recognizes the rights of coparceners of daughters as well since birth.….It is the very factum of birth in a coparcenary that creates the coparcenary, therefore the sons and daughters of a coparcener become coparceners by virtue of birth. Devolution of coparcenary property is the later stage of and a consequence of death of a coparcener. The first stage of a coparcenary is obviously its creation as explained above, and as is well recognized. One of the incidents of coparcenary is the right of a coparcener to seek a severance of status. Hence, the rights of coparceners emanate and flow from birth (now including daughters) as is evident from sub-s (1)(a) and (b).”

The Post Amendment Glitch

Ever since the incorporation of the said amendment in the Hindu Mitakshara Law, there has been certain instances where the courts, while decreeing the such partition suits, have decided that the daughters are not entitled to any share, either on the ground that they were born prior to the enactment of the Act or on the ground that they were married daughters and at the time of their marriage, they had received gold and money and had, hence, relinquished their share; and hence, they cannot be considered as coparceners.

The general argument that the share acquired by the coparceners’ daughter is after the amendment in the Act was also rejected by the court of Law in yet another case.

This view of the trial court is time and again supported by the upheld by the High Court leading to filing of several appeals in Supreme Court.

Recent Precedent

One such appeal has been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, few days back, wherein a Division Bench comprising of Justice AK Sikri and Justice Ashok Bhushan analyzed and explained the Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as incorporated in the year 2005, in the Mitakshara law; vide a recent judgement of Danamma @ Suman Surpur and Anr. v. Amar and Ors.; wherein an appeal in was filed, before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by two daughters of one, Gurulingappa Savadi, propositus of a Hindu Joint Family. Apart from these two daughters, Savadi had two sons, Arun kumar and Vijay. Gurulingappa Savadi died in the year 2001 leaving behind the two daughters, two sons and his widow, Sumitra. After his death, Amar, who is the son of Arun kumar filed a suit for partition of property. The case set up by him was that the two daughters were not the coparceners in the said joint family as they were born prior to the enactment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act). It was also pleaded that they were married daughters and at the time of their marriage they had received gold and money and had, hence, relinquished their share.

The question of law which was considered by the Supreme Court was whether, the daughters of Gurulingappa Savadi, could be denied their share on the ground that they were born prior to the enactment of the Act and, therefore, cannot be treated as coparceners? Alternate question was whether, with the passing of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, the appellants would become coparcener “by birth” in their “own right in the same manner as the son” and would, therefore, be entitled to equal share as that of a son?

The Court turned down contention that the suit for partition was filed in 2002, i.e. before the 2005 amendment. It held that the suit was decreed only in 2007 and the right of the two daughters got crystallised in 2005.

The Apex Court interpreted the amendment in Section-6 of the Act and stated that,

“no doubt, suit for partition was filed in the year 2002. However, during the pendency of this suit, Section 6 of the Act was amended as the decree was passed by the trial court only in the year 2007. Thus, the rights of the appellants got crystallised in the year 2005 and this event should have been kept in mind by the trial court as well as by the High Court.”

The Apex Court rightly highlighted that the rights of daughters in coparcenaries property, as per the amended S. 6, are not lost merely because a preliminary decree has been passed in a partition suit. So far as partition suits are concerned, the partition becomes final only on the passing of a final decree. Where such situation arises, the preliminary decree would have to be amended taking into account the change in the law by the amendment of 2005.

PC (Amendment) Act 2018: Retrospective or Prospective – Part 1

Harsh K. Sharma

1 Mar 2018

PC (Amendment) Act 2018: Retrospective or Prospective – Part 1

LATEST POSITION OF LAW

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Case of State Of Telangana vs Managipet @ Mangipet Sarveshwar[1] upholding the decision of the High Court observed that “The question as to whether a sanction is necessary to prosecute the Accused Officer, a retired public servant, is a question which can be examined during the course of the trial as held by this Court in K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP [2].”

        It was further observed that, “In the present case, the FIR was registered on 9th November, 2011 much before the Act was amended in the year 2018. Whether any offence has been committed or not has to be examined in the light of the provisions of the statute as it existed prior to the amendment carried out on 26th July, 2018.”

          Karnataka High Court while dismissing a petition filed by a retired engineer who was prosecuted for possessing assets disproportionate to his known source of income, held that the amendments made to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, making it mandatory to take prior sanctions, both to conduct investigation as well as prosecution, of even retired public servants is “prospective” in nature. It was further stated that a statute, which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities, shall be construed to be prospective in operation unless otherwise provided either expressly or by necessary implication. A careful reading of Section 17A as also Section 19, do not contain any express provision to show that they are retrospective in nature nor it is discernible by application.

             Pointing out that apex court had laid down that anti-corruption law has to be interpreted in such a fashion as to strengthen fight against corruption and where two constructions are eminently reasonable, the courts have to accept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption, the court said.

AMENDMENTS IN THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT: AN OVERVIEW

A bare reading of the Provisions of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, noticeable distinctive features emerge, listing a few:-

  1. Some Sections of the Principal Act stands omitted e.g. Section 11 (w.r.t “or agrees to accept”); Section 24 of Principal Act etc.
  2. Some Insertions in Words, Brackets, Letters and Figures are introduced e.g. Section 2, Section 19 (Clause C) of the Principal Act.
  3. Some Sections stands Substituted e.g. Section 4 (4); Section 7, 8, 9 & 10; Section 11 (marginal heading and words); Section 12; Section 13; Section 14; Section 15 (words, bracket and letter); Section 16 (words, bracket and letter); Section 17 (words, bracket and letter); Section 19 (words & figures); Section 20; Section 23 (marginal heading, word, figures, brackets and letter) of the Principal Act.
  4. Some Sections /Chapters which were not in existence in the Principal Act are inserted e.g. after Section 17 of Principal Act, Section 17A has been inserted; after Chapter IV of the Principal Act, Chapter IVA has been inserted; after Section 29 of the Principal Act, Section 29A has been inserted.

         Interestingly vide Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, dated 26.07.2018, there is no amendment in Sections 3, 5, 6, 18, 21, 22, 25 to 28, 30 & 31 of the Principal Act. The corresponding Sections of the Principal Act, provides with the following:-

Section 3Powers to Appoint Special Judges;
Section 5Procedure & Powers of Special Judges;
Section 6Powers to try summarily;
Section 18Powers to Inspect Bankers’ Book;
Section 21Accused Person to be a competent witness;
Section 22The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 to apply subject to certain modification; 
Section 25Military, Naval &Air Force or other Laws not to be affected;
Section 26Special Judges appointed under Act 46 of 1952 to be Special Judges appointed under this Act;
Section 27Appeal & Revision;
Section 28Act to be in addition to any other law;
Section 30Repeal and saving; (Inference drawn)
Section 31Omission of certain Sections of Act, 45 of 1860; (i.e. Indian Penal Code) (Inference drawn)

Section 30 of PC Act (both pre-amended and post-amended) provides as follows:-

30. Repeal and saving.—

  1. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of1947) and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952) are hereby repealed.
  2. Notwithstanding such repeal, but without prejudice to the application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the Acts so repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provision of this Act.

              Accordingly, this provision does not save the repealed/omitted or substituted provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Pre-amended) because the essence of amendment is directly in-consistent with the substituted provisions of previously existent PC Act.

           Further, Section 31 of PC Act (both pre-amended and post-amended) provides as follows:-

  1. Omission of certain sections of Act 45 of 1860.—Sections 161 to 165A (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) shall be omitted, and section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), shall apply to such omission as if the said sections had been repealed by a Central Act.

              Accordingly, this provision does not save the repealed/ omitted or substituted provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Pre-amended). Ra ther, specific reference to Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 97), specifically deals with the omissions only related to the acts and provisions, which were repealed i.e. Section 161 to 165A of IPC only and thus even the General Clauses Act does not save the provisions of Pre-Amended Act /Principal Act which stood either Omitted explicitly or the provisions, which got Omitted by the process Substitution.

AMENDMENT AND ITS ANOMALIES

With plethora of court cases wherein the competent court has summoned the accused persons under the Principal Act i.e. the Act which was in force uptill 25.07.2018, but stands amended w.e.f. 26.07.2018 has led to numerous anomaly. Primarily because the Prevention of Corruption Act is a Special Act and its provisions would prevail and will have an overriding effect on the general law.

          Accordingly, though under the general law, the cognizance is taken under Section 190 Cr.P.C. by a Magistrate, but in view of Section 3 of PC Act, the judicial officer competent to be appointed as Special Judge, would be a Session Judge or Addl. Session Judge or Assistant Session Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

            Further, as per Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the trial of the offences under PC Act, prescribed under Section 3 (1) shall be done by the Special Judges only, prescribed under Section 3 (2) of PC Act.

             Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, does not explicitly specify as to whether the Amended Provisions would have a retrospective effect i.e. presumed to be effected from 9th Sept. 1988, i.e. the day when the Principal Act was notified or in alternative, the Amended Provisions would be operated from the day, the notification of Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 was published.

            Creation of a rider is a beneficial provision for those persons who ceases to be Public Servant, as on the day when the indulgence of the court is sought for taking cognizance and it is a settled rule of law that benefit of beneficial provision would always be given retrospectively.

           Reference to this effect, can be safely made to Section 428 of Cr.P.C. wherein the benefit of period of Pre-trial custody is provided to the accused irrespective of the fact as to whether the said pre-trial custody was in the same case or in a different case.

Featured Insights Harsh Sharma, Ex-Member, Special Committee, Bar Council of Delhi, Founder, Prosoll Law Inc on his glorious thirty years in the legal fraternity

Harsh K. Sharma

7 Feb 2018

Featured Insights Harsh Sharma, Ex-Member, Special Committee, Bar Council of Delhi, Founder, Prosoll Law Inc on his glorious thirty years in the legal fraternity

With aim and vision of great vertical extent, he decided to set up his own practice under the name “Prosoll Law Inc.” a leading law firm with an objective to render the best legal service to society with the highest standard of professional and moral ethical standards.Possessing immense knowledge and experience in various streams of law but Mr. Sharma regards each day as class of new learning being a student of Law.

    “Patience, Perseverance and Constant Study is Basic three Essentials to be a Good Lawyer!” -Harsh K. Sharma

In this interview, he talks to us about:

  • The relaxed environment of Delhi University back in the ‘80s.
  • How importance does he assign to mentorship in litigation?
  • Some of his high profile cases.
  • His glorified experience of being in the legal fraternity for over thirty years.

7 Years After Filing Charge Sheet, CBI Closes Prosecution Evidence Against OP Chautala In DA Case

Harsh K. Sharma and Vaibhavi Sharma

16 Nov 2017

7 Years After Filing Charge Sheet, CBI Closes Prosecution Evidence Against OP Chautala In DA Case

In what could be termed another example of prolonged trial, seven years after filing charge sheet against former Haryana Chief Minister OP Chautala, the Central Bureau of Investigation has closed prosecution evidence in a case of disproportionate assets.Special Public Prosecutor for CBI Ajay Gupta informed special CBI judge Manoj Jain that the probe agency wants to close prosecution…

Ex-min Thungon acquitted in 21-year-old DA case

Harsh K. Sharma and Vaibhavi Sharma

9 May 2017

Ex-min Thungon acquitted in 21-year-old DA case

Former union minister P K Thungon, who was facing prosecution for 21 years in an alleged disproportionate assets case, has been acquitted by a Special Court which said the CBI has failed to prove its case.

Special CBI Judge Pitamber Dutt absolved Thungon, former Minister of State in Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment, saying the prosecution has not succeeded in proving the offence against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Thungon, who in 1975 became the youngest Chief Minister at the age of 29 heading the Arunachal Pradesh government, was charged for allegedly possessing assets disproportionate to his known sources of income to the tune of Rs 1,08,16,532 between June 1991 and April 1996 when he was the minister in the P V Narsimha Rao-led government at the Centre.

“I am of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove on record beyond reasonable doubt that accused P K Thungon was having disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs 1,08,16,532 beyond his known sources of income for which he could not explain satisfactorily,” the judge said.

The court, in its 156-page judgement, said Thungon was having excess income of Rs 1.07 lakh after deducting the total assets found in his possession which he acquired during the check period.

During the trial, Thungon denied his involvement in the commission of offence and stated that he has been falsely implicated in this case.

Ex-minister P K Thungon acquitted in 21-yr-old DA case

Harsh K. Sharma and Vaibhavi Sharma

8 May 2017

Ex-minister P K Thungon acquitted in 21-yr-old DA case

Former union minister P K Thungon, who was facing prosecution for 21 years in an alleged disproportionate assets case, has been acquitted by a Special Court which said the CBI has failed to prove its case.
 
Special CBI Judge Pitamber Dutt absolved Thungon, former Minister of State in Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment, saying the prosecution has not succeeded in proving the offence against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Former union minister P K Thungon acquitted by Special Court in 21-year-old DA case

Harsh K. Sharma and Vaibhavi Sharma

8 May 2017

Former union minister P K Thungon acquitted by Special Court in 21-year-old DA case

New Delhi: Former union minister P K Thungon, who was facing prosecution for 21 years in an alleged disproportionate assets case, has been acquitted by a Special Court which said the CBI has failed to prove its case.

Special CBI Judge Pitamber Dutt absolved Thungon, former Minister of State in Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment, saying the prosecution has not succeeded in proving the offence against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Thungon, who in 1975 became the youngest chief minister at the age of 29 heading the Arunachal Pradesh government, was charged for allegedly possessing assets disproportionate to his known sources of income to the tune of Rs 1,08,16,532 between June 1991 and April 1996 when he was the minister in the P V Narsimha Rao-led government at the Centre.

“I am of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove on record beyond reasonable doubt that accused P K Thungon was having …

Delhi Court transfers disproportionate assets case against INLD leader Ajay Chautala

Harsh K. Sharma and Vaibhavi Sharma

16 Mar 2017

Delhi Court transfers disproportionate assets case against INLD leader Ajay Chautala

A Delhi court on Thursday transferred a disproportionate assets case against INLD leader Ajay Chautala, who is serving a 10-year jail term in JBT scam case, to another court.

District Judge Ravinder Kaur allowed Ajay’s plea seeking transfer of the DA case after he apprehended that he would not get a fair trial if the case continued to be tried by the court presided by the same judge, a special CBI judge.